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Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory and the Measurement Problem
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Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universita¨t,
Max-von-Laue-Str. 1, 60438 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of
view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is
based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is
mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not
to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity
to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to
solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of
quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but
more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the
uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence
of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the nineteen-twenties quantum theory can be
considered as the most fundamental description of nature
being accessible so far, at least in the microscopic range.
All matter and interaction fields of the standard model
of particle physics are described within the framework of
relativistic quantum field theories. Even general relativ-
ity is assumed to obey a quantum theoretical description
on a fundamental level. However, the interpretation of
quantum theory is still ambiguous. The Copenhagen in-
terpretation can probably be regarded as the standard
interpretation of quantum theory. But there arises the
question if this interpretation is really understood and
if the philosophical attitude of Werner Heisenberg and
Niels Bohr is received accurately. In this paper there is
hold the opinion that the Copenhagen interpretation is
inevitable at least as a necessary condition to obtain a
real comprehension of quantum theory. To justify this
view it is important to emphasize the decisive philosoph-
ical attitude it is based on. There will be given some
fundamental philosophical reasons suggesting that it is
mandatory concerning all further considerations as the
treatment of the measurement problem. The core of the
Copenhagen interpretation is founded in Bohr’s state-
ment that all phenomena which can appear in human
experience, no matter if they are everyday phenomena or
if they refer to the atomic or subatomic range, have to be
described by classical concepts. Concerning an adequate
comprehension of this constitutive assertion of Bohr that
classical concepts are indispensable for a description of
experiments it will be important to distinguish very care-
fully between ontological and epistemological arguments.
I think that subjectivistic misinterpretations of Heisen-
berg’s and Bohr’s attitude have their origin in a miss-
ing accuracy concerning the distinction between this two
sorts of arguments.
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Independent of this, the measurement problem of quan-
tum theory seems to be the decisive aspect concerning
the question of consistence of quantum theory. It is re-
lated to the two different ways a state can change with
time according to the postulates of quantum theory, with
respect to the time dependent Schroedinger equation, if
no measurement is performed, and spontaneously, if a
measurement is performed. Together with the composi-
tion rule these two ways a state can change seem to imply
an inherent contradiction of quantum theory. Therefore
it seems to be necessary to explore the fundamental pos-
tulates of the abstract Hilbert space formulation of quan-
tum theory concerning their relation to each other on the
one hand and their status of fundamentality on the other
hand.
As an attempt to circumvent this inherent ambiguity
of quantum theory it will be suggested that the ele-
ment of indeterminacy within quantum theory does not
represent a fundamental property of nature in a strict
ontological sense but has its origin in the necessity to
use macroscopic objects as measurement instruments on
which classical concepts can be applied. Here the deci-
sive argument is that it is impossible to know all degrees
of freedom of macroscopic objects being used as measure-
ment instruments but that these degrees of freedom have
an important influence on the way the state changes dur-
ing the interaction between the measured object and the
measurement instrument. In this sense the element of in-
determinacy in quantum theory is interpreted similar to
the indeterminacy within statistical mechanics but in a
much more principle way, since in statistical mechanics it
is in principle always thinkable to omit this statistical ele-
ment whereas in quantum theory it is mandatory because
of the necessity to use classical concepts for a description
of an experiment. This necessity to use classical concepts
has its origin in the special constitution of human per-
ception which is based on these concepts although they
do not correspond to nature, at least not exactly, what
can be considered as the reason for the epistemological
origin of the necessity to use classical concepts.
Besides, it will be investigated the closely related ques-
2tion of the ontological status of the uncertainty relation
and the quantum states and it will be given an interpre-
tation of the non locality of quantum theory. Because
of the fact that the dynamics of quantum theory takes
place within an abstract Hilbert space which can be rep-
resented by referring to the position space or the momen-
tum space but does not presuppose it in its most abstract
formulation, the assumption seems to be plausible that
the existence of a position space is a derived quantity
which means that the position space we live in is the
consequence of a certain representation of the dynamics
of quantum theory. The effects where non locality ap-
pears explicitly, in the double slit experiment performed
with single particles for example, or the correlation of
spin states of particles with a large distance and the cor-
responding Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox [1], can be
considered as natural according to this attitude which
is therefore strongly supported by them. The local de-
scription of classical physics seems to represent only an
approximation where the representation in position space
works very well. Concerning this consideration it is deci-
sive that the validity of the uncertainty relation is inde-
pendent of the indeterminacy in the description of quan-
tum theory. The indeterminacy within the description of
nature by quantum theory has its origin in accordance
to the above consideration in the necessity to use macro-
scopic measurement instruments perturbing the state of
a particle in way leading to a state accurately localized.
The localization is necessary because all measurements
are based on measurements of position from which other
quantities are derived. But this does not imply that the
uncertainty relation itself implies an indeterministic de-
scription in a fundamental ontological sense, because the
evolution of the quantum states which have not to be
localized very sharply are governed by the Schroedinger
equation yielding a completely deterministic description.
Because of these reasons there is suggested a strict onto-
logical interpretation of a quantum theoretical state rep-
resented as a wave function implying that the measured
classical variables are only classical approximations.
II. THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF
QUANTUM THEORY
In general it is hold the opinion that the Copenhagen
interpretation is accepted as the established interpreta-
tion of quantum theory. But the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion seems to be ambiguous by itself and thus there might
exist the necessity to give an interpretation of itself to ob-
tain clearness about its real philosophical attitude. With
respect to this it is decisive to be aware of the fact that
the philosophical position of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation is essentially based on epistemological arguments.
Often it seems to be interpreted in a way to much subjec-
tivistic and positivistic. Such a kind of misapprehension
seems to arise from a confusion between epistemologi-
cal and ontological arguments. These two sorts of ar-
guments have to be distinguished very carefully, if one
deals with the interpretation of quantum theory. It will
be made the attempt to give a justification of the attitude
of Heisenberg and Bohr by relating it to the epistemol-
ogy of Immanuel Kant. According to Carl Friedrich von
Weizsaecker there exists a very close relation between
the thinking of Kant and Bohr [2]. Let us begin with a
citation of Heisenberg. Heisenberg’s own description of
the Copenhagen interpretation begins with the following
sentences [3]:
”‘The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory begins with a paradox. Every physi-
cal experiment, no matter if it refers to phe-
nomena of daily live or to atomic physics, has
to be described by the concepts of classical
physics. The concepts of classical physics rep-
resent the language in which we describe the
configuration of our experiments and deter-
mine the results. We cannot replace them
by other concepts. Nevertheless the applica-
bility of these concepts is limited due to the
uncertainty relations.”’
Werner Heisenberg, Physik und Philosophie
(”‘Physics and Philosophy”’), 1958 [23].
Here we have the decisive statement of the Copenhagen
interpretation referring to the necessity to use classical
concepts. But it is equally important that the applica-
bility of these concepts is limited according to the un-
certainty relation representing the decisive property of
quantum theory. Because of this tension the distinction
between epistemology and ontology becomes very impor-
tant. With respect to this consideration it is decisive to
emphasize the mentioned fact that the uncertainty re-
lation has an ontological status independent of human
knowledge within quantum theory. The positivistic as-
sertion that an exact position and an exact momentum
cannot exist at the same time because it is impossible
to measure them does not belong to the Copenhagen in-
terpretation. Heisenberg has found the uncertainty rela-
tion by remembering a conversation with Albert Einstein
where Einstein has emphasized the opposite point of view
that a theory is necessary to determine which quantities
can be measured. The argumentation of Heisenberg was
that there do not exist states where an exact position and
an exact momentum is defined at the same time accord-
ing to the postulates of quantum theory and therefore
it has to be impossible to measure them. His thought
experiment with the photon showing the impossibility to
measure both quantities exactly just served to reply to
the objection that it seemed to be possible to measure
them [4, 5, 6].
The uncertainty can further not be interpreted as an in-
completeness of quantum theory because there are many
experiments like the double slit experiment where the as-
sumption of an exact trajectory of a particle would cause
contradictions. The interference pattern of the double
slit experiment with single photons, for example, can only
3be interpreted, if it is not determined through which slit
the trajectory of the photon runs. Especially the phase
relations being not measurable directly are constitutive
to understand this phenomenon. This means that na-
ture does not obey a description by classical concepts
like a trajectory of a particle. (A theory of hidden vari-
ables, discussed in [7] for example, cannot be excluded,
but seems to be implausible, because in this case the
non classical phenomena in the atomic and subatomic
range have to be derived from an underlying descrip-
tion whereas these phenomena arise naturally from usual
quantum theory.)
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen interpretation asserts that
these concepts are indispensable for a description of ex-
periments. Why is it impossible to replace them by other
concepts ? The answer to this question cannot be found
in nature itself. It can only be found in the way of human
perception.
The reason why we have to describe nature by using clas-
sical concepts has its origin in the way we have experi-
ence and thus in our relation to nature and not in nature
itself. According to the philosophy of Kant space and
time are basic constituents of human experience [8, 9].
They are preconditions to have experience (at least hu-
man experience) and are therefore constitutive for hav-
ing experience, because it is not even possible to imagine
a perception which does not contain space and time as
basic shapes of experience. From this decisive epistemo-
logical insight he concluded that they are given a priori
before any experience and thus represent basic proper-
ties of human perception being indispensable for human
mind to obtain access to the real world. Causality was
interpreted in a similar way by Kant.
The concepts of classical mechanics are in accordance
with this structures of human perception given a priori.
They correspond to the concepts of our mind. Quantum
theory describes reality in a way being much more gen-
eral. The uncertainty relation limits the validity of the
classical concepts in the real world. But nevertheless they
remain constitutive for human experience. Thus Bohr’s
statement concerning the necessity of classical concepts
is closely related to the attitude of Kant. Kant could
not anticipate the development of modern physics which
led Bohr to the insight that there exist phenomena be-
ing not in accordance with the structures of human per-
ception but which are nevertheless reflected within this
structures, if human beings describe experiments. Bohr’s
concept of complementarity arises from this relation be-
tween the limitation of the classical concepts and the in-
evitability to use them in experience. Classical concepts
are not suitable to describe the phenomena. But by using
several concepts which contradict each other within the
realm of our classical thinking we can obtain an under-
standing of the reality behind these concepts which are
only able to yield an idea of this greater reality which is
represented inadequately by using them. An elementary
particle like the electron for example is nothing which
can be object of human experience with respect to its
real nature. It is just possible to percept its representa-
tions within the structures of human experience and hu-
man thinking where electrons can appear as particles or
waves depending on the situation of observance but not
with respect to their real nature which is not recognizable
for human beings. Concerning these considerations a ci-
tation of von Weizsaecker seems to be very illuminative
[2]:
”‘The parallelism of the two attitudes is
all the more remarkable, since Bohr never
seemed to have read Kant extensively. As
distinguished from Kant, Bohr learned from
modern atomic physics that there exists sci-
ence beyond the scope where processes can
be described reasonably through properties of
objects being independent of the situation of
the observer. This is expressed by his idea of
complementarity.”’
Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, Die Einheit
der Natur (”‘The Unity of Nature”’), 1971.
By incorporating the idea of biological evolution to the
philosophy of human knowledge of Kant classical con-
cepts, especially space and time, appear as real entities
again, because the structures of human knowledge have
been adapted to the structures of the real world to en-
able surviving [10, 11]. But this idea of the evolution-
ary philosophy of human knowledge just implies that the
structures of human mind correspond to the real world
in a way being accurately enough to enable surviving but
not to yield objective truth in an absolute sense. Thus
the description of physics in terms of classical concepts,
as particles within a position space for example, is true
in the sense that it represents an approximation of the
structure of the real world but it has not to be true in an
absolute sense as modern physics, with respect to quan-
tum theory as well as to special and general relativity,
has shown. This is the reason why we have to use clas-
sical concepts on the one hand, at least concerning the
description of experiments, and why they are not in ac-
cordance with the structures of the real world on the
other hand.
The philosophical attitude of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation arises from this duality between the real world and
our mind. If the concepts of our thinking correspond to
the explored phenomena very closely like this is the case
in classical physics, we can neglect the influence of our
mind to our perception. But in quantum theory these
concepts do not work any more and therefore we have to
refer to the relation of our mind to nature. This does
not mean that the behaviour of nature depends on the
way we describe it or that our consciousness has an in-
fluence to the result of a measurement. This would be
an enormous misinterpretation of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation. But it means that if we describe nature, we
have do it as human beings and therefore our description
of nature(not nature itself) is also determined by and
related to the inherent structures of human perception.
4III. THE POSTULATES OF QUANTUM
THEORY
Let us give a short review about the postulates of
general quantum theory formulated in terms of the
abstract Hilbert space representation of Paul Dirac
and John von Neumann [12, 13]. This will be helpful
to formulate the core of the measurement problem
explicitly and to question the meaning of the different
postulates concerning their status of fundamentality. In
the sequel of the next section it will be referred to this
classification of the postulates of quantum theory.
postulate 1:
A physical system is described by a vector |ψ〉 within an
abstract complex Hilbert space H being a vector space
which is endowed with an inner product 〈·|·〉.
postulate 2:
An observable quantity is described by a linear Hermi-
tian operator A within the Hilbert space H. This means
that the eigenvalues of an operator representing such an
observable quantity are the possible values one can get
by performing a measurement. Because the Operator is
Hermitian, meaning that A = A†, the eigenvalues are
real.
postulate 3:
There is specified a special operator H belonging to
a certain system and determining the time evolution
of a state. This is called Hamiltonian. If there takes
place no measurement (interaction with a macroscopic
system), then the state of the system evolves with time
according to the Schroedinger equation i∂t|ψ〉 = H |ψ〉
which expresses that the application of the general time
translation operator to a state is equal to the application
of the Hamiltonian being a function of the observable
quantities determining the state or the system. This
dynamical evolution can equivalently be formulated
within the Heisenberg picture where the observable
quantities depend on time according to the commutator
with the Hamiltonian d
dt
A = 1
i~
[A,H ]−.
postulate 4:
If there is performed a measurement of a certain
quantity, then the vector changes into an eigenvector
of the corresponding operator and the measured value
is the eigenvalue to the corresponding eigenstate. It
is not determined to which eigenstate the vector will
convert. But the probability p(|ψ〉 → |a〉) to convert to
a special eigenstate corresponds the square of the value
of the inner product(defining the Hilbert space structure
of postulate 1) between the state immediately before
the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate
p(|ψ〉 → |a〉) = |〈a|ψ〉|2.
postulate 5:
If there are two systems described by two vectors, |ϕ〉
and |χ〉, within two different Hilbert spaces, then the
two systems can be combined and the complete system
is described by the tensor product of these states |ϕ〉⊗|χ〉.
Regarding the postulates of quantum theory it is very
important to realize that quantum theory in this abstract
setting does not presuppose a position or a momentum
space. The fact that time seems to be more fundamen-
tal than space does not contradict special relativity, be-
cause special relativity asserts only that time and space
are combined with each other in a different way than in
classical mechanics but it does not abolish the difference
between space and time. If one refers to a special iner-
tial system, there is specified a time direction in a distin-
guished way and there still exists a causal structure being
independent of the inertial system. However, the ques-
tion of time is very difficult and will not be treated in this
consideration. It shall just be mentioned that it seems
not to be possible to omit the concept of a real time. All
laws of physics presuppose the concept of time which is
the most fundamental concept of human thinking. Even
the existence of consciousness presupposes time but no
space [8, 9]. Since it is not possible to justify the second
law of thermodynamics without a reference to time, be-
cause the concept of probability presupposes the concept
of time, it seems not to be possible to derive the exis-
tence of a time direction distinguished from the space
directions from thermodynamics for example [14, 15].
IV. THE CORE OF THE MEASUREMENT
PROBLEM AS THE CORE OF THE
CONSISTENCE PROBLEM OF QUANTUM
THEORY
The decisive conceptual problem of quantum theory is
related to the two different ways a quantum state can
change according to the postulates of quantum theory.
If there is performed no measurement (there takes place
no interaction with a macroscopic instrument), a quan-
tum state evolves with respect to the time dependent
Schroedinger equation. This is expressed by postulate
3. In the Heisenberg picture the observable quantities
evolve instead of the state according to the commutator
with the Hamiltonian. The description of the time evolu-
tion is completely deterministic. But if there takes place
a measurement, the state is changed instantaneously and
this takes place in an indeterministic way and the state
only determines the probability of a conversion into an
eigenstate of the measured variable what is expressed by
postulate 4. This two ways a state can change according
to quantum theory contained within the postulates 3 and
4 in the above classification do not seem to be commen-
surable, if one additionally assumes that postulate 5, the
composition rule, is correct. This has its origin in the
following argumentation:
If one considers a system S1 which state is represented
by a vector |ψ(t)〉, then if one performs a measurement
5of the quantity described by an operator A at the time
t, the state is converted immediately to an eigenstate
|a〉 with a probability given by the squared inner prod-
uct between the state immediately before the interaction
with the measurement instrument M and the eigenstate
|〈a|ψ(t)〉|2. This description is not deterministic. Ran-
dom gets a meaning in a principle sense. But with respect
to this fact one has to realize that measurement means
interaction with a (macroscopic) system. And if quantum
theory is assumed to yield a fundamental description of
nature, or at least a more fundamental description than
any classical theory like classical mechanics referring to
macroscopic systems,M has to be ruled by quantum the-
ory also. It may be that it is enough to describe it with a
classical theory, but such a theory itself is considered as
an approximation to quantum theory, if one assumes that
quantum theory is fundamental in the mentioned sense.
Thus M itself can be treated as a quantum theoretical
system SM and therefore its state can also be described
as a vector |Ψ(t)〉 within a Hilbert space. And this im-
plies according to postulate 5 that one can compose the
system of the observed object S1 considered originally
being described by the state |ψ(t)〉 and the system of
the measurement instrument SM represented by the state
|Ψ(t)〉 to one system SC described by the tensor product
of these two states |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |ψ(t)〉. But the dynamics
of this composed system SC is described by a Hamilto-
nian determined by the two systems and therefore the
evolution of this state is described deterministic as long
as there is performed no measurement with respect to
a new measurement system referring to the composed
system. The Hamiltonian of the composed system HC
can be written as the sum of the free Hamiltonian of the
measured system Hψ , the free Hamiltonian of the mea-
surement instrument HΨ and an interaction Hamiltonian
HI
HC = Hψ +HΨ +HI (1)
and determines the dynamics of the composed system
according to the corresponding Schroedinger equation
i∂t (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |ψ(t)〉) = HC (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |ψ(t)〉) . (2)
Since the measurement process represents an interaction
between S1 and SM , this implies a dynamical and thus
deterministic description of the measurement process.
This means that in the first case we seem to have an
indeterministic description of the system SC consisting
of S1 and SM , since the state of the measured object
changes spontaneously, and in the second case we seem
to have a deterministic description of the same situation
where S1 andM are considered as one big system SC with
respect to a new measurement instrument. And this im-
plies that quantum theory seems to contradict itself with
respect to this ambiguity. The above argumentation can
also be found in [16, 17].
Thus the conceptual problem within quantum theory is
not that its description of nature is non causal or that it
is non local. This aspects contradict the structures of hu-
man knowledge but this is nothing which makes a theory
seeming to be implausible. I would almost assert that it
is the other way round. The fact that the concepts of
a theory are not in accordance with our imagination is
not only no objection, it is even to be expected that the
behaviour of nature on a very fundamental level deviates
from the structures of human thinking. If one deals with
the philosophy of human knowledge by incorporation of
the biological evolution according to to the epistemolog-
ical consideration given within the above description of
the Copenhagen interpretation, one should not be aston-
ished that the structures of the real world are much dif-
ferent than the structures of human thinking and having
experience. This is because of the fact that they have
developed according to the advantage they yielded hu-
man beings in surviving and not according to the aim
of obtaining objective knowledge about the world. Thus
the real conceptual problem of quantum theory is that
it seems to contradict itself with respect to the two dif-
ferent ways a state can change according to postulate 3
and postulate 4. Concerning this point one deals with
an inherent contradiction of the theory, not a contradic-
tion to our imagination but between the postulates of
the theory itself. Thus it appears as one central task
concerning a deeper comprehension of quantum theory
to reconcile postulate 3 and 4 with respect to postulate
5. This means at least that these postulates have to be
reinterpreted with respect to their statement about the
fundamental behaviour of nature.
V. ATTEMPT OF A RECONCILIATION BY
REFERRING TO THE NECESSITY TO USE
MACROSCOPIC MEASUREMENT
INSTRUMENTS TO OBSERVE A QUANTUM
SYSTEM
If one accepts the contradiction at this stage of com-
prehension between postulate 3 on the on hand and pos-
tulate 4 under incorporation of postulate 5 on the other
hand which becomes manifest within the above consider-
ation, there arise several possibilities for a reconciliation.
One possibility could be that one of the two postulates
referring to the changing of states in quantum theory is
wrong. Another possibility could be that postulate 5 is
wrong. But this assumption that one of these postulates
is simply wrong is not very plausible because the postu-
lates are confirmed empirically very well. Besides, the
several postulates of quantum theory belong together,
because they build one closed framework for the descrip-
tion of nature. If one of the postulates were not cor-
rect, then one should expect that the whole framework
of quantum theory would be relativized by a completely
new theory being more fundamental and containing it as
an approximation, but it is not very plausible to assume
6that quantum theory being very successful concerning the
area of experience where it is assumed to be valid should
be changed by itself. Thus there arises the task to obtain
a better comprehension of the meaning of the postulates
concerning their relation to each other suggesting another
possibility which consists in the assumption that one of
the postulates has to be reinterpreted in a certain way.
Carlo Rovelli has suggested the so called relational inter-
pretation of quantum theory [16, 17, 18]. According to
this interpretation a state is only defined with respect to
a certain observer. The state of the system with respect
to an observer who performs a measurement of a system
S1 with a measurement instrument M1 has to be distin-
guished from the state with respect to another observer
who performs a measurement of the from S1 and M1
composed system with another measurement instrument
M2. Thus the measurement problem is solved in a way
seeming to be similar to the attitude special relativity is
based on. In my opinion this approach represents a very
interesting way to reconcile the above postulates.
However, there exists another possibility to cope with the
problem. This possibility is preferred in this paper, be-
cause it is more conservative. This means that it needs
no additional precondition with respect to the postulates
of quantum theory. It consists in the assumption that
one of the two postulates represents not a fundamental
description of nature but serves as an effective descrip-
tion with respect to the other postulate from which it
can in principle be derived. In this paper this possibility
is advocated and accordingly it is assumed that postu-
late 4 is a consequence of postulate 3. And this attitude
seems to be quite plausible, if one remembers the central
postulate of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory: Experiments have to be described by classical
concepts implying that a measurement instrument has to
be a macroscopic system. Such a system obeys quantum
theory but it can effectively be described in a classical
way. To enable a classical treatment in an approximative
way, the measurement instrument has to consist of a very
large number of particles and this number has to be as
large that it becomes impossible to know its state exactly
consisting of the states of all its constituents and their en-
tanglement. But if the exact state of the measurement
instrument cannot be known exactly, it is also impos-
sible to describe the interaction between the measured
object and the measurement instrument in an exact way,
because the reaction of the measured system (describ-
ing perhaps only one particle) will be very sensitive to
very small differences of the exact states of the particles
the measurement instrument consists of and the quan-
tum system is entangled with during the measurement
process. This is in accordance with the phenomenon of
decoherence appearing as a consequence of correlations
of quantum systems with the environment which cause
an annihilation of phase relations and thus interference
effects and lead to a transition to classical properties.
Considerations of decoherence concerning the interpre-
tation of quantum theory can be found in [19] and in
[20] there is especially regarded the relation of decoher-
ence to Bohr’s decisive statement of the inevitability of
classical concepts. Thus there seems to be offered the
possibility that postulate 4 could indeed be derived from
postulate 3. In a fundamental description the measure-
ment process would therefore be deterministic, but there
would be only accessible an effective description because
of the fact that the measurement instrument has to be
described as a classical system to be accessible for hu-
man perception. If this assumption that postulate 4 can
in principle be derived from postulate 3 were correct,
then quantum theory would be deterministic in a rigor-
ous ontological sense. The element of indeterminacy in
quantum theory would be similar to the role it plays in
statistical mechanics, where random arises from the lack-
ing knowledge of the constituents of the system. How-
ever, the situation in quantum theory would be a little
bit different nevertheless, because in quantum theory it
is a direct consequence of the way human beings have
experience. To describe the status of indeterminacy cor-
responding to this interpretation of quantum theory we
should therefore first classify different stages on which an
element of indeterminacy can appear in a physical theory.
Concerning this we will distinguish between the following
meanings of indeterminacy within a physical theory:
1 no indeterminacy (classical mechanics, classical
electrodynamics for example):
In such a kind of theory there exists no element of inde-
terminacy. The dynamical evolution of all constituents
necessary to yield a complete description of a physical
system described by the theory is determined.
2 indeterminacy in an epistemological sense
having practical reasons (statistical mechanics
for example):
In such a kind of theory the appearing indeterminacy
has to do with a lack of knowledge by practical reasons.
It is not possible to know all parameters determining
the dynamics of a system because of its complexity.
But in principle it would be possible to measure all the
constituents determining the dynamical evolution and a
deterministic description is thinkable in principle.
3 indeterminacy in an epistemological sense
having principle reasons (the interpretation of
this paper to reconcile postulate 3 and 4 for
example):
In such a kind of theory the indeterminacy also arises
from a lack of knowledge. But in contrast to the above
case it is in principle impossible to get the information
being necessary for a deterministic description. The
nature of human perception excludes a deterministic
description in principle. (One has to use a macroscopic
system to measure the state of a particle for example.)
4 indeterminacy in an ontological sense (quan-
tum theory with postulate 4 assumed to be
fundamental for example):
7There exists an element of real indeterminacy within
such a theory. This has nothing to to with our way to
describe the world and the impossibility to obtain exact
knowledge of all constituents describing the system but
has an ontological status.
As already indicated within the brackets the inter-
pretation of the quantum theoretical measurement
problem advocated within this paper corresponds to
an element of indeterminacy in the meaning 3 of the
above classification. Indeterminacy has no ontological
status, at least not according to the description of nature
given by quantum theory. However, with respect to the
description of nature by human beings there exists a
fundamental element of indeterminacy being inevitable.
It has its origin in the indispensability for human beings
to describe physical objects as being located within a
position space. All measurements, even measurements
of internal variables are derived from measurements
of a position. If the spin of a particle is measured
within a Stern Gerlach experiment for example, the
quantity being measured directly is the position which
is performed by observing where there appears an ab-
sorbance. From this there is inferred the corresponding
momentum which is directly correlated to the spin of a
particle. The most fundamental objects in nature known
so far are described by quantum theory implying states
not describing trajectories in the kinematical sense of
classical mechanics according to the uncertainty relation
and have no sharp position and momentum at the same
time. They are not even located to a small region, if
they appear as free objects. Only within bound states
within larger systems incorporating other objects there
can be obtained a more sharply localization (within the
borders defined by the uncertainty relation). To enable
the description as a classical system an object has to
consist of such a large number of particles that it is
impossible to know its state exactly. Space is a pre-
condition for human perception. But only macroscopic
objects fulfil the precondition to obey such a description.
Therefore it is necessary to consider an interaction of
an elementary particle with a macroscopic object to
obtain knowledge about it. And this implies that there
is only possible an indeterministic description. Due to
the above argumentation this element of indeterminacy
cannot be omitted. With respect to statistical mechanics
it is at least thinkable that the exact state of every
constituent of a complex system is measured and thus a
deterministic description is not excluded in principle but
by practical reasons. In quantum theory such a descrip-
tion is not even thinkable because to measure the states
of all the particles a measurement instrument consists
of one would need another macroscopic measurement
instrument for which the same argumentation would
be valid. An attitude being quite similar is described
explicitly by Peter Mittelstaedt [21]:
”‘It belongs to these preconditions that there
has to be used a measurement instrument of
macroscopic dimension. Because during an
interaction of this instrument with the ob-
ject the information being available originally
in compact form is distributed to the esti-
mated 1020 degrees of freedom of the mea-
surement instrument and becomes - at least
to a certain extent - practically unavailable.
This is because the calculational description
of the complex equation systems which are
given in the large state space of S+M [mea-
sured system and measurement instrument]
extends the scope of the real possibilities com-
pletely.”’
Peter Mittelstaedt, Philosophische Probleme
der modernen Physik (”‘Philosophical Prob-
lems in Modern Physics”’), 1963.
That the theory according to the attempt for a recon-
ciliation of postulate 3 and 4 presented here is not de-
terministic in the sense that random appears not in an
ontological but in an epistemological sense in a principle
way, is logically completely independent of the interpre-
tation of the uncertainty relation, especially the fact that
it makes no sense to talk about an exact location and an
exact momentum of a particle at the same time which ex-
tends the accuracy being determined by the uncertainty
relation being a direct consequence of the postulates of
quantum theory. Often the new sort of description of na-
ture related to quantum theory is presented in such a way
that in quantum theory one describes just probabilities
and one gets something real, if one measures the position
or the momentum. According to such an attitude the
state has no reality by itself but just with respect to the
observable quantities. I think that by referring to the
way the contradiction between postulate 3 and postulate
4 is reconciled it is much more plausible to interpret the
state as a real entity. With respect to this interpretation
the structure of the abstract Hilbert space is considered
to be more fundamental and the representation within a
space of positions or momenta is interpreted to be a de-
rived one. Concerning this aspect one has to remember
that the postulates of quantum theory according to Dirac
and von Neumann [12, 13] do not presuppose a space of
positions and momenta, not even in the sense of a repre-
sentation space for the states which appear as wave func-
tions in such a representation. Internal degrees of free-
dom for example have no relation to position space at all.
Accordingly, postulate 3 describes a dynamical evolution
of a state in Hilbert space which serves as a complete
description of a physical system without mandatorily re-
ferring to measurable quantities. This yields a strong jus-
tification of the opinion that states by themselves have a
higher degree of reality than representations by observ-
able quantities like position and momentum which are
quantities being measurable directly. Concerning a gen-
eral state being degenerated with respect to a certain
observable quantity it makes no sense to assume that
there exists a real value of this observable quantity and
8the state just describes the probability distribution. The
state itself has to be considered as the reality. Therefore
let us cite again Mittelstaedt [21]:
”‘The matter of fact that |ϕ〉 is the state of
the system S, represents an objective prop-
erty of S in the sense that the operator Pϕ =
|ϕ〉〈ϕ| has the measurement value 1 instead of
0. The coefficients 〈Ai|ϕ〉 = ϕ(Ai) are noth-
ing else than a special representation of the
state |ϕ〉 and indicate that the system S holds
indeed the state |ϕ〉. Pϕ has thus to be con-
sidered as an objective description of the sys-
tem S.”’
Peter Mittelstaedt, Philosophische Probleme
der modernen Physik (”‘Philosophical Prob-
lems in Modern Physics”’), 1963.
This attitude holding that states have a higher ontologi-
cal status than quantities being directly measurable gets
important support by the mentioned fact that the phase
of a quantum theoretical wave function in position space
not even corresponds to probabilities of quantities being
directly measurable. Nevertheless it is necessary for an
explanation of certain effects of interference and therefore
has to be considered as an ontological reality.
VI. THE DUALITY BETWEEN PARTICLES
AND WAVES AND THE RELATION BETWEEN
THE ABSTRACT HILBERT SPACE OF STATES
AND SPACE-TIME
In this section there shall be given a short comment
on the duality between particles and waves and then it
will be made the attempt to explore the consequences of
the above considerations with respect to the ontological
status of space within quantum theory.
I think that the duality between particles and waves has
to be interpreted in such a way that particles being de-
scribed by abstract states in Hilbert space which can be
represented in position space are the fundamental entities
of nature. Quantum fields should be interpreted as multi
particle states. However, a particle is no localized object
in the classical sense. It is described by a state obeying
the uncertainty relation. This means that it would be
more suitable to define a particle in the sense of a quan-
tum which can be distinguished from other quanta in a
discrete way . And such a quantum can also be denoted
as a wave in the sense that its state can be represented
as a wave. The waves of quantum field theory have to be
interpreted as composed objects from the fundamental
particles which states are represented as waves, too. In
the approximation of a delta function in position space
the state itself gets the properties of a classical particle.
Concerning a real comprehension of the ontological
meaning of the uncertainty relation and the correspond-
ing non locality of quantum theory which becomes man-
ifest especially with respect to the Einstein Podolsky
Rosen paradox [1] and the corresponding close relation
between particles being separated by a large distance,
there has to be considered an attitude where non locality
is essential and locality appears as a macroscopic phe-
nomenon in nature. The general abstract formulation
of quantum theory which does not refer to position or
momentum space seems to enable such an attitude and
Bohr’s concept of individuality [22] seems to be a mani-
festation of this essential non locality. Therefore it is sug-
gested that position space is just a kind of representation
of relations between dynamical entities. With respect to
this quantum theory corresponds to the philosophical im-
plications about the nature of space-time within general
relativity where the metric structure of space-time is de-
scribed as a dynamical entity and coordinates lose their
physical meaning according to the property of diffeomor-
phism invariance. Therefore it seems to be plausible that
the structure of space time as a (3+1)-dimensional man-
ifold is itself a kind of representation of an underlying
structure of abstract states in Hilbert space. (This does
not imply that time loses its special status.) Since quan-
tum theory has to be assumed to be more general than
classical physics, its concepts have to be interpreted as
being more exact. The concept of particles moving in a
space-time being an independent physical entity is a clas-
sical concept. But the structure of quantum theory in its
general formulation refers to states in Hilbert space which
may be represented approximatively in an 3-dimensional
position space and the corresponding momentum space,
respectively. The limits of validity of this representation
is given by the uncertainty relation. The space of human
imagination is a kind of representation of the physical re-
lations within the real world. It is mandatory for human
perception and it reflects and corresponds to the approx-
imative structure of classical physics where the kinemat-
ics of objects can be described by trajectories through
space with a sharp position and a sharp momentum at
the same time although it is not completely isomorphic
to the structure of the real world as it is shown by the
uncertainty relation.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
It has been made the attempt to understand the philo-
sophical attitude of the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum theory which is assumed to be constitutive for a
comprehension of the physical meaning of quantum the-
ory, at least as a necessary condition. Concerning this
it was decisive to emphasize the epistemological charac-
ter of the arguments of Heisenberg and Bohr. Besides
it has been advocated the opinion that the measurement
problem which has been presented as the decisive concep-
tual problem of quantum theory can be solved by inves-
tigating the ontological status of the postulates referring
to a changing of quantum states and their relation to
each other. This has led to an interpretation of quan-
tum theory which is related to the statistical character
9of statistical mechanics and arises from the necessity to
use macroscopic measurement instruments which obey
classical concepts to describe quantum physics. This ne-
cessity to use macroscopic objects corresponding to the
approximative applicability of classical concepts has its
origin in the constitution of human perception which is
based on location within a position space. According
to this interpretation indeterminacy has no meaning in
a strict ontological sense but in a principle epistemolog-
ical sense which means that it is inevitable because of
the relation and incommensurability of the description
of nature according to quantum states obeying the un-
certainty relation and the nature of human perception.
After all from the above argumentations there has been
drawn the conclusion that the description of nature by
objects within a position space reflects a certain structure
which is derived from the more abstract and therefore
more general description by quantum states of elemen-
tary objects whose real nature the concepts of a position
and a momentum are not able to comprise in a suitable
way.
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